Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Approximately maximizing efficiency and revenue in polyhedral environments
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
General auction mechanism for search advertising
Proceedings of the 18th international conference on World wide web
Incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi-unit auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Pure and Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy for Generalized Second Price Auction
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
An Ascending Vickrey Auction for Selling Bases of a Matroid
Operations Research
GSP auctions with correlated types
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Multi-keyword sponsored search
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Single valued combinatorial auctions with budgets
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Weighted proportional allocation
Proceedings of the ACM SIGMETRICS joint international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
No justified complaints: on fair sharing of multiple resources
Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
On multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Proceedings of the sixth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining
Auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Optimal auctions via the multiplicative weight method
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Prior-free auctions for budgeted agents
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Composable and efficient mechanisms
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Balanced allocation mechanism: An optimal mechanism for multiple keywords sponsored search auctions
Information Sciences: an International Journal
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A central issue in applying auction theory in practice is the problem of dealing with budget-constrained agents. A desirable goal in practice is to design incentive compatible, individually rational, and Pareto optimal auctions while respecting the budget constraints. Achieving this goal is particularly challenging in the presence of nontrivial combinatorial constraints over the set of feasible allocations. Toward this goal and motivated by AdWords auctions, we present an auction for polymatroidal environments satisfying the above properties. Our auction employs a novel clinching technique with a clean geometric description and only needs an oracle access to the submodular function defining the polymatroid. As a result, this auction not only simplifies and generalizes all previous results, it applies to several new applications including AdWords Auctions, bandwidth markets, and video on demand. In particular, our characterization of the AdWords auction as polymatroidal constraints might be of independent interest. This allows us to design the first mechanism for Ad Auctions taking into account simultaneously budgets, multiple keywords and multiple slots. We show that it is impossible to extend this result to generic polyhedral constraints. This also implies an impossibility result for multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginal utilities in the presence of budget constraints.