A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling

Authors:
Jon Feldman;S. Muthukrishnan;Evdokia Nikolova;Martin Pál
Affiliations:
Google, Inc.,;Google, Inc.,;Massachusetts Institute of Technology,;Google, Inc.,
Venue:
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Year:
2008

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Abstract

We consider the Offline Ad Slot Schedulingproblem, where advertisers must be scheduled to sponsored searchslots during a given period of time. Advertisers specify a budget constraint, as well as a maximum cost per click, and may not be assigned to more than one slot for a particular search. We give a truthful mechanism under the utility model where bidders try to maximize their clicks, subject to their personal constraints. In addition, we show that the revenue-maximizing mechanism is not truthful, but has a Nash equilibrium whose outcome is identical to our mechanism. Our mechanism employs a descending-price auction that maintains a solution to a certain machine scheduling problem whose job lengths depend on the price, and hence are variable over the auction.