A new polynomial-time algorithm for linear programming
Combinatorica
A Level Algorithm for Preemptive Scheduling
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Preemptive Scheduling of Uniform Processor Systems
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Strategic bidder behavior in sponsored search auctions
Decision Support Systems
Dynamics of bid optimization in online advertisement auctions
Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web
Optimal delivery of sponsored search advertisements subject to budget constraints
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
AdWords and generalized online matching
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
An ontology-based approach to Chinese semantic advertising
Information Sciences: an International Journal
On multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
| Hi-index | 0.07 |
This paper presents an optimal mechanism for allocating slots of multiple keywords to bidders who have only one budget limit for all their desired keywords; it is called the balanced allocation mechanism. In a balanced allocation, all the bidders and slots for the keywords are partitioned into consecutive and distinct structures called balanced blocks. The study develops efficient algorithms for this mechanism. For instance, an algorithm is developed to create a ''perfect schedule'' for each independent, balanced block. Using this scheduling, all the slots and budgets of all bidders will be consumed. The balanced allocation mechanism creates a balanced allocation with perfect scheduling for each balanced block. This research confirms that this is an optimal truthful mechanism that maximizes the revenue of a search engine.