Resource allocation problems: algorithmic approaches
Resource allocation problems: algorithmic approaches
Fast Approximation Algorithms for the Knapsack and Sum of Subset Problems
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Market Equilibrium via a Primal-Dual-Type Algorithm
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Comparison of allocation rules for paid placement advertising in search engines
ICEC '03 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An adaptive algorithm for selecting profitable keywords for search-based advertising services
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Budget optimization in search-based advertising auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Allocating online advertisement space with unreliable estimates
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithm for stochastic multiple-choice knapsack problem and application to keywords bidding
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
Proceedings of the 25th international conference on Machine learning
A Knapsack Secretary Problem with Applications
APPROX '07/RANDOM '07 Proceedings of the 10th International Workshop on Approximation and the 11th International Workshop on Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
An empirical analysis of return on investment maximization in sponsored search auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Data Mining and Audience Intelligence for Advertising
Bid optimization for broad match ad auctions
Proceedings of the 18th international conference on World wide web
Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Selling ad campaigns: online algorithms with cancellations
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal Auctions Capturing Constraints in Sponsored Search
AAIM '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management
Proportional Response Dynamics in the Fisher Market
ICALP '09 Proceedings of the 36th Internatilonal Collogquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part II
Framework for timely and accurate ads on mobile devices
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Information and knowledge management
Promotion analysis in multi-dimensional space
Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment
Stochastic models for budget optimization in search-based advertising
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Sponsored search with contexts
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Mathematics of Operations Research
Proportional response dynamics in the Fisher market
Theoretical Computer Science
Stochastic variability in sponsored search auctions: observations and models
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Multi-keyword sponsored search
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
Repeated budgeted second price ad auction
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Prompt mechanism for ad placement over time
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Understanding fraudulent activities in online ad exchanges
Proceedings of the 2011 ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement conference
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
Adword auction bidding strategies of budget-limited advertisers on competing search engines
Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Network and Services Management
Joint optimization of bid and budget allocation in sponsored search
Proceedings of the 18th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Sponsored search auctions: an overview of research with emphasis on game theoretic aspects
Electronic Commerce Research
Using Priced Options to Solve the Exposure Problem in Sequential Auctions
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)
Optimizing budget constrained spend in search advertising
Proceedings of the sixth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining
Real time bid optimization with smooth budget delivery in online advertising
Proceedings of the Seventh International Workshop on Data Mining for Online Advertising
Balanced allocation mechanism: An optimal mechanism for multiple keywords sponsored search auctions
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Repeated Budgeted Second Price Ad Auction
Theory of Computing Systems
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We consider the problem of online keyword advertising auctions among multiple bidders with limited budgets, and study a natural bidding heuristic in which advertisers attempt to optimize their utility by equalizing their return-on-investment across all keywords. We show that existing auction mechanisms combined with this heuristic can experience cycling (as has been observed in many current systems), and therefore propose a modified class of mechanisms with small random perturbations. This perturbation is reminiscent of the small time-dependent perturbations employed in the dynamical systems literature to convert many types of chaos into attracting motions. We show that the perturbed mechanism provably converges in the case of first-price auctions and experimentally converges in the case of second-price auctions. Moreover, the point of convergence has a natural economic interpretation as the unique market equilibrium in the case of first-price mechanisms. In the case of second-price auctions, we conjecture that it converges to the "supply-aware" market equilibrium. Thus, our results can be alternatively described as a tâtonnement process for convergence to market equilibriumin which prices are adjusted on the side of the buyers rather than the sellers. We also observe that perturbation in mechanism design is useful in a broader context: In general, it can allow bidders to "share" a particular item, leading to stable allocations and pricing for the bidders, and improved revenue for the auctioneer.