An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Dynamics of bid optimization in online advertisement auctions
Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web
A theory of expressiveness in mechanisms
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Expressive banner ad auctions and model-based online optimization for clearing
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
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IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Maintaining equilibria during exploration in sponsored search auctions
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Computing optimal bundles for sponsored search
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Mathematical modeling of competition in sponsored search market
Proceedings of the 2010 Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation
Buy-it-now or take-a-chance: a simple sequential screening mechanism
Proceedings of the 20th international conference on World wide web
Marketing Science
Chapter 14: building search computing applications
Search Computing
Revenue maximization via hiding item attributes
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Signaling Competition and Social Welfare
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
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We examine a formal model of sponsored search in which advertisers can bid not only on search terms, but on search terms under specific contexts. A context is any auxiliary information that might accompany a search, and might include information that is factual, estimated or inferred. Natural examples of contexts include the zip code, gender, or abstract "intentions" (such as researching a vacation) of the searcher. After introducing a natural probabilistic model for contextbased auctions, we provide several theoretical results, including the fact that under general circumstances, the overall social welfare of the advertisers and auctioneer together can only increase when moving from standard to context-based mechanisms. In contrast, we provide and discuss specific examples in which only one party (advertisers or auctioneer) benefits at the expense of the other in moving to context-based search.