Antisocial Agents and Vickrey Auctions
ATAL '01 Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Intelligent Agents VIII
Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
AdWords and Generalized On-line Matching
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Designing online auctions with past performance information
Decision Support Systems
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Revenue analysis of a family of ranking rules for keyword auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mediators in position auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Asymptotically optimal repeated auctions for sponsored search
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce
Vindictive bidding in keyword auctions
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce
Forward looking Nash equilibrium for keyword auction
Information Processing Letters
Incorporating user utility into sponsored-search auctions
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Models of malicious behavior in sponsored search
SpringSim '07 Proceedings of the 2007 spring simulation multiconference - Volume 3
Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Diversification in the internet economy: the role of for-profit mediators
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
A Cascade Model for Externalities in Sponsored Search
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Sponsored Search Auctions with Reserve Prices: Going Beyond Separability
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
On the Equilibria and Efficiency of the GSP Mechanism in Keyword Auctions with Externalities
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
User modeling in position auctions: re-considering the GSP and VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
The adwords problem: online keyword matching with budgeted bidders under random permutations
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Expressive banner ad auctions and model-based online optimization for clearing
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Externalities in Keyword Auctions: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Contract Auctions for Sponsored Search
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Ex Ante Information and the Design of Keyword Auctions
Information Systems Research
Maintaining equilibria during exploration in sponsored search auctions
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Equilibrium analysis of dynamic bidding in sponsored search auctions
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Sponsored search with contexts
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Capacity constraints and the inevitability of mediators in adword auctions
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Empirical price modeling for sponsored search
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Simulation-based game theoretic analysis of keyword auctions with low-dimensional bidding strategies
UAI '09 Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Discrete strategies in keyword auctions and their inefficiency for locally aware bidders
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Mathematics of Operations Research
GSP auctions with correlated types
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
AdCell: ad allocation in cellular networks
ESA'11 Proceedings of the 19th European conference on Algorithms
On revenue in the generalized second price auction
Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web
Efficient ranking in sponsored search
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Sponsored search auctions: an overview of research with emphasis on game theoretic aspects
Electronic Commerce Research
Maximizing revenue from strategic recommendations under decaying trust
Proceedings of the 21st ACM international conference on Information and knowledge management
Revenue guarantees in sponsored search auctions
ESA'12 Proceedings of the 20th Annual European conference on Algorithms
Balanced allocation mechanism: An optimal mechanism for multiple keywords sponsored search auctions
Information Sciences: an International Journal
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Billions of dollars are spent each year on sponsored search, a form of advertising where merchants pay for placement alongside web search results. Slots for ad listings are allocated via an auction-style mechanism where the higher a merchant bids, the more likely his ad is to appear above other ads on the page. In this paper we analyze the incentive, efficiency, and revenue properties of two slot auction designs: "rank by bid" (RBB) and "rank by revenue" (RBR), which correspond to stylized versions of the mechanisms currently used by Yahoo! and Google, respectively. We also consider first- and second-price payment rules together with each of these allocation rules, as both have been used historically. We consider both the "short-run" incomplete information setting and the "long-run" complete information setting. With incomplete information, neither RBB nor RBR are truthful with either first or second pricing. We find that the informational requirements of RBB are much weaker than those of RBR, but that RBR is efficient whereas RBB is not. We also show that no revenue ranking of RBB and RBR is possible given an arbitrary distribution over bidder values and relevance. With complete information, we find that no equilibrium exists with first pricing using either RBB or RBR. We show that there typically exists a multitude of equilibria with second pricing, and we bound the divergence of (economic) value in such equilibria from the value obtained assuming all merchants bid truthfully.