The art of computer programming, volume 3: (2nd ed.) sorting and searching
The art of computer programming, volume 3: (2nd ed.) sorting and searching
Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An Introduction to Copulas (Springer Series in Statistics)
An Introduction to Copulas (Springer Series in Statistics)
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Gsp-exr: gsp protocol with an exclusive right for keyword auctions
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
Proceedings of the 25th international conference on Machine learning
Diversification in the internet economy: the role of for-profit mediators
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Simulation-based analysis of keyword auctions
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
An expressive auction design for online display advertising
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
The value of location in keyword auctions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Maintaining equilibria during exploration in sponsored search auctions
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Auctions with revenue guarantees for sponsored search
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Equilibrium analysis of dynamic bidding in sponsored search auctions
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Capacity constraints and the inevitability of mediators in adword auctions
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Ad auction design and user experience
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Personalized ad delivery when ads fatigue: an approximation algorithm
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Simulation-based game theoretic analysis of keyword auctions with low-dimensional bidding strategies
UAI '09 Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Strategy and mechanism lessons from the first ad auctions trading agent competition
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Designing a Successful Adaptive Agent for TAC Ad Auction
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Keyword auction protocol for dynamically adjusting the number of advertisements
Web Intelligence and Agent Systems
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Discrete choice models of bidder behavior in sponsored search
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Efficient ranking in sponsored search
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Sponsored search auctions: an overview of research with emphasis on game theoretic aspects
Electronic Commerce Research
Ranking and tradeoffs in sponsored search auctions
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Revenue optimization in the generalized second-price auction
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimization of ads allocation in sponsored search
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web companion
A predictive model for advertiser value-per-click in sponsored search
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
A game- heoretic machine learning approach for revenue maximization in sponsored search
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Optimal keyword auctions for optimal user experiences
Decision Support Systems
Online learning for auction mechanism in bandit setting
Decision Support Systems
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Keyword auctions lie at the core of the business models of today's leading search engines. Advertisers bid for placement alongside search results, and are charged for clicks on their ads. Advertisers are typically ranked according to a score that takes into account their bids and potential click-through rates. We consider a family of ranking rules that contains those typically used to model Yahoo! and Google's auction designs as special cases. We find that in general neither of these is necessarily revenue-optimal in equilibrium, and that the choice of ranking rule can be guided by considering the correlation between bidders' values and click-through rates. We propose a simple approach to determine a revenue-optimal ranking rule within our family, taking into account effects on advertiser satisfaction and user experience. We illustrate the approach using Monte-Carlo simulations based on distributions fitted to Yahoo! bid and click-through rate data for a high-volume keyword.