Revenue analysis of a family of ranking rules for keyword auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Click fraud resistant methods for learning click-through rates
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
A co-dependent value-based mechanism for the internet advertisement auction
PRIMA'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Agent Based Simulation for a Sustainable Society and Multi-agent Smart Computing
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When users click on poor quality advertisements, there is a hidden cost to the search engine due to the user dissatisfaction (for instance, users are less likely to click on ads in the future). We describe how to incorporate hidden costs into the GSP auction for internet ads such that it is in an advertiser's self interest to create a user experience that maximizes efficiency.