Comparison of allocation rules for paid placement advertising in search engines
ICEC '03 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Electronic commerce
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Towards a pay-per-action model in sponsored search
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce
AdWords and generalized online matching
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Pay-per-action model for online advertising
Proceedings of the 1st international workshop on Data mining and audience intelligence for advertising
Dynamic cost-per-action mechanisms and applications to online advertising
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
Competition and Fraud in Online Advertising Markets
Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Computational challenges in e-commerce
Communications of the ACM - Rural engineering development
A few bad votes too many?: towards robust ranking in social media
AIRWeb '08 Proceedings of the 4th international workshop on Adversarial information retrieval on the web
The Glitch in On-line Advertising: A Study of Click Fraud in Pay-Per-Click Advertising Programs
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Pay-Per-Action Model for On-line Advertising
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Proceedings of the Second ACM International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining
Predictive Pricing and Revenue Sharing
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
The Glitch in On-line Advertising: A Study of Click Fraud in Pay-Per-Click Advertising Programs
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Pay-Per-Action Model for On-line Advertising
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
User modeling in position auctions: re-considering the GSP and VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Characterizing truthful multi-armed bandit mechanisms: extended abstract
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Managing the quality of CPC traffic
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Security and artificial intelligence
Contract Auctions for Sponsored Search
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
The value of location in keyword auctions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Fighting online click-fraud using bluff ads
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
SpotRank: a robust voting system for social news websites
Proceedings of the 4th workshop on Information credibility
Auctions with revenue guarantees for sponsored search
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Ad auction design and user experience
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Pay-per-action model for online advertising
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Foundations and Trends in Information Retrieval
Understanding fraudulent activities in online ad exchanges
Proceedings of the 2011 ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement conference
Measuring and fingerprinting click-spam in ad networks
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2012 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication
Measuring and fingerprinting click-spam in ad networks
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review - Special october issue SIGCOMM '12
Sponsored search auctions: an overview of research with emphasis on game theoretic aspects
Electronic Commerce Research
Bayesian vote weighting in crowdsourcing systems
ICCCI'12 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Computational Collective Intelligence: technologies and applications - Volume Part I
Dynamic Pay-Per-Action Mechanisms and Applications to Online Advertising
Operations Research
Hi-index | 0.00 |
In pay-per-click online advertising systems like Google, Overture, or MSN, advertisers are charged for their ads only when a user clicks on the ad. While these systems have many advantages over other methods of selling online ads, they suffer from one major drawback. They are highly susceptible to a particular style of fraudulent attack called click fraud. Click fraud happens when an advertiser or service provider generates clicks on an ad with the sole intent of increasing the payment of the advertiser. Leaders in the pay-per-click marketplace have identified click fraud as the most significant threat to their business model. We demonstrate that a particular class of learning algorithms, called click-based algorithms, are resistant to click fraud in some sense. We focus on a simple situation in which there is just one ad slot, and show that fraudulent clicks can not increase the expected payment per impression by more than o(1) in a click-based algorithm. Conversely, we show that other common learning algorithms are vulnerable to fraudulent attacks.