Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Predicting clicks: estimating the click-through rate for new ads
Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web
Hybrid keyword search auctions
Proceedings of the 18th international conference on World wide web
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Click fraud resistant methods for learning click-through rates
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Conversion rate based bid adjustment for sponsored search
Proceedings of the 19th international conference on World wide web
Impression-plus-click auctions
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Sponsored search auctions: an overview of research with emphasis on game theoretic aspects
Electronic Commerce Research
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In sponsored search auctions advertisers typically pay a fixed amount per click that their advertisements receive. In particular, the advertiser and the publisher enter into a contract (e.g., the publisher displays the ad; the advertiser pays the publisher 10 cents per click), and each party's subjective value for such a contract depends on their estimated click-through rates (CTR) for the ad. Starting from this motivating example, we define and analyze a class of contract auctions that generalize the classical second price auction. As an application, we introduce impression-plus-click pricing for sponsored search, in which advertisers pay a fixed amount per impression plus an additional amount if their ad is clicked. Of note, when the advertiser's estimated CTR is higher than the publisher's estimated CTR, both parties find negative click payments advantageous, where the advertiser pays the publisher a premium for the impression but the publisher then pays the advertiser per click.