The Search: How Google and Its Rivals Rewrote the Rules of Business and Transformed Our Culture
The Search: How Google and Its Rivals Rewrote the Rules of Business and Transformed Our Culture
Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Revenue analysis of a family of ranking rules for keyword auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Performance of the Vickrey auction for digital goods under various bid distributions
Performance Evaluation
Internet Ad Auctions: Insights and Directions
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part I
Design and Ownership of Two-Sided Networks: Implications for Internet Platforms
Journal of Management Information Systems
Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical
Operations Research
Click fraud resistant methods for learning click-through rates
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Discrete strategies in keyword auctions and their inefficiency for locally aware bidders
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Sponsored search auctions: an overview of research with emphasis on game theoretic aspects
Electronic Commerce Research
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Sponsored links on search engines are an emerging advertising tool, whereby a number of slots are put on sale through keyword auctions. This is also known as contextual advertising. Slot assignment and pricing in keyword auctions are then essential for the search engine's management since provide the main stream of revenues, and are typically accomplished by the Generalized Second Price (GSP) mechanism. In GSP the price of slots is a monotone function of the slot location, being larger for the highest slots. Though a higher location is associated with larger revenues, the lower costs associated with the lowest slots may make them more attractive for the advertiser. The contribution of this research is to show, by analytical and simulation results based on the theory of order statistics, that advertisers may not get the optimal slot they aim at (the slot maximizing their expected profit) and that the GSP mechanism may be unfair to all the winning bidders but the one who submitted the lowest bid.