Performance of the Vickrey auction for digital goods under various bid distributions

Authors:
M. Naldi;G. D'Acquisto
Affiliations:
Universití di Roma "Tor Vergata", Dip. di Informatica Sistemi Produzione (DISP), Via del Politecnico 1, 00133 Roma, Italy;Universití di Roma "Tor Vergata", Dip. di Informatica Sistemi Produzione (DISP), Via del Politecnico 1, 00133 Roma, Italy
Venue:
Performance Evaluation
Year:
2008

Citing 8
Cited 5

The FCC on personal wireless

IEEE Spectrum
Telecommunications

IEEE Spectrum - Special issue: technology 1995
Pricing the Internet

Public access to the Internet
Competitive auctions and digital goods

SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The Dynamics of the UMDL Service Market Society

CIA '98 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents II, Learning, Mobility and Electronic Commerce for Information Discovery on the Internet
Applications of flexible pricing in business-to-business electronic commerce

IBM Systems Journal
Opportunities for electronic commerce in networking

IEEE Communications Magazine
Pricing, provisioning and peering: dynamic markets for differentiated Internet services and implications for network interconnections

IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications

Detection of anomalous bids in procurement auctions

Decision Support Systems
The value of location in keyword auctions

Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
On the design of sponsored keyword advertising slot auctions: An analysis of a generalized second-price auction approach

Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
A rank-and-compare algorithm to detect abnormally low bids in procurement auctions

Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
An Adaptable Job Submission System Based on Moderate Price-Adjusting Policy in Market-Based Grids

Wireless Personal Communications: An International Journal

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

The generalized Vickrey auction is analysed as a mechanism for setting prices of digital goods. A selection of models of the bidders' behaviour (embodied by the probability distribution of their bids' values) are employed to derive the optimal auctioneer's choice as to the number of items to sell. The satisfaction levels of both the auctioneer and the bidders are taken into account through the evaluation of the expected revenues, the percentage of winning bidders and their aggregated utilities under each of the probabilistic scenarios considered.