Antisocial Agents and Vickrey Auctions
ATAL '01 Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Intelligent Agents VIII
An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Vindictive bidding in keyword auctions
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce
Artificial Intelligence
The value of location in keyword auctions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Equilibrium analysis of dynamic bidding in sponsored search auctions
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Cooperative or vindictive: bidding strategies in sponsored search auction
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Simulation-based game theoretic analysis of keyword auctions with low-dimensional bidding strategies
UAI '09 Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Pure and Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy for Generalized Second Price Auction
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Computer Science Review
Repeated budgeted second price ad auction
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On revenue in the generalized second price auction
Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web
Sponsored search auctions: an overview of research with emphasis on game theoretic aspects
Electronic Commerce Research
A theoretical examination of practical game playing: lookahead search
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
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We study formally discrete bidding strategies for the game induced by the Generalized Second Price keyword auction mechanism. Such strategies have seen experimental evaluation in the recent literature as parts of iterative best response procedures, which have been shown not to converge. We give a detailed definition of iterative best response under these strategies and, under appropriate discretization of the players' strategy spaces we find that the discretized configurations space contains socially optimal pure Nash equilibria. We cast the strategies under a new light, by studying their performance for bidders that act based on local information; we prove bounds for the worst-case ratio of the social cost of locally stable configurations, relative to the socially optimum cost.