Introduction to Stochastic Search and Optimization
Introduction to Stochastic Search and Optimization
An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Revenue analysis of a family of ranking rules for keyword auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Stochastic search methods for nash equilibrium approximation in simulation-based games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Simulation-based analysis of keyword auctions
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Designing a Successful Adaptive Agent for TAC Ad Auction
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Discrete strategies in keyword auctions and their inefficiency for locally aware bidders
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Constrained automated mechanism design for infinite games of incomplete information
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Ranking and tradeoffs in sponsored search auctions
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Predicting advertiser bidding behaviors in sponsored search by rationality modeling
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
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We perform a simulation-based analysis of keyword auctions modeled as one-shot games of incomplete information to study a series of mechanism design questions. Our first question addresses the degree to which incentive compatibility fails in generalized second-price (GSP) auctions. Our results suggest that sincere bidding in GSP auctions is a strikingly poor strategy and a poor predictor of equilibrium outcomes. We next show that the rank-by-revenue mechanism is welfare optimal, corroborating past results. Finally, we analyze profit as a function of auction mechanism under a series of alternative settings. Our conclusions coincide with those of Lahaie and Pennock [2007] when values and quality scores are strongly positively correlated: in such a case, rank-by-bid rules are clearly superior. We diverge, however, in showing that auctions that put little weight on quality scores almost universally dominate the pure rank-by-revenue scheme.