Gsp-exr: gsp protocol with an exclusive right for keyword auctions

Authors:
Yuko Sakurai;Atsushi Iwasaki;Yasumasa Saito;Makoto Yokoo
Affiliations:
Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan;Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan;Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan;Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan
Venue:
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
Year:
2008

Citing 3
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Abstract

We propose a keyword auction protocol called the Generalized Second Price with an Exclusive Right (GSP-ExR). In existing keyword auctions, the number of displayed advertisements is determined in advance. Thus, we consider adjusting the number of advertisements dynamically based on bids. In the GSP-ExR, the number of slots can be either 1 or K. When K slots are displayed, the protocol is identical to the GSP. If the value per click of the highest ranked bidder is large enough, then this bidder can exclusively display her advertisement by paying a premium. Thus, this pricing scheme is relatively simple and seller revenue is at least as good as the GSP. Also, in the GSP-ExR, the highest ranked bidder has no incentive to change the number of slots by over/under-bidding as long as she retains the top position.