Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An Introduction to Copulas (Springer Series in Statistics)
An Introduction to Copulas (Springer Series in Statistics)
Revenue analysis of a family of ranking rules for keyword auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Externalities in online advertising
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
A Cascade Model for Externalities in Sponsored Search
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Impersonation strategies in auctions
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
On revenue in the generalized second price auction
Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web
Efficient ranking in sponsored search
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Computing nash equilibria of action-graph games via support enumeration
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We consider the optimization of revenue in advertising auctions based on the generalized second-price (GSP) paradigm, which has become a de facto standard. We examine several different GSP variants (including squashing and different types of reserve prices), and consider how to set their parameters optimally. One intriguing finding is that charging each advertiser the same per-click reserve price ("unweighted reserve prices") yields dramatically more revenue than the quality-weighted reserve prices that have become common practice. This result is robust, arising both from theoretical analysis and from two different kinds of computational experiments. We also identify a new GSP variant that is revenue optimal in restricted settings. Finally, we study how squashing and reserve prices interact, and how equilibrium selection affects the revenue of GSP when features such as reserves or squashing are applied.