Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Evaluating the accuracy of implicit feedback from clicks and query reformulations in Web search
ACM Transactions on Information Systems (TOIS)
Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Allocating online advertisement space with unreliable estimates
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An experimental comparison of click position-bias models
WSDM '08 Proceedings of the 2008 International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining
Externalities in online advertising
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
Maintaining equilibria during exploration in sponsored search auctions
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Stochastic models for budget optimization in search-based advertising
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Sponsored Search Auctions with Reserve Prices: Going Beyond Separability
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Sponsored Search Auctions with Markovian Users
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
On the Equilibria and Efficiency of the GSP Mechanism in Keyword Auctions with Externalities
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Externalities in Keyword Auctions: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
A New Ranking Scheme of the GSP Mechanism with Markovian Users
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Temporal click model for sponsored search
Proceedings of the 33rd international ACM SIGIR conference on Research and development in information retrieval
Bayesian Browsing Model: Exact Inference of Document Relevance from Petabyte-Scale Data
ACM Transactions on Knowledge Discovery from Data (TKDD)
Mathematical modeling of competition in sponsored search market
Proceedings of the 2010 Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation
Keyword auction protocol for dynamically adjusting the number of advertisements
Web Intelligence and Agent Systems
Optimizing two-dimensional search results presentation
Proceedings of the fourth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining
Marketing Science
Optimal auctions with positive network externalities
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Money for nothing: exploiting negative externalities
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Externalities among advertisers in sponsored search
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Sponsored search auctions with conflict constraints
Proceedings of the fifth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining
Relational click prediction for sponsored search
Proceedings of the fifth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining
A truthful learning mechanism for contextual multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalities
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
A truthful learning mechanism for multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalities
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Sponsored search auctions: an overview of research with emphasis on game theoretic aspects
Electronic Commerce Research
Budget optimization for online campaigns with positive carryover effects
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Ad allocation for browse sessions
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Optimal Auctions with Positive Network Externalities
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation - Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory
Whole-page optimization and submodular welfare maximization with online bidders
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Revenue optimization in the generalized second-price auction
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Which mechanism for sponsored search auctions with externalities?
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Computationally efficient techniques for economic mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Competitive auctions for markets with positive externalities
ICALP'13 Proceedings of the 40th international conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Location-Based sponsored search advertising
SSTD'13 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Advances in Spatial and Temporal Databases
User satisfaction in competitive sponsored search
Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on World wide web
Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on World wide web
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One of the most important yet insufficiently studied issues in online advertising is the externality effect among ads: the value of an ad impression on a page is affected not just by the location that the ad is placed in, but also by the set of other ads displayed on the page. For instance, a high quality competing ad can detract users from another ad, while a low quality ad could cause the viewer to abandon the page altogether. In this paper, we propose and analyze a model for externalities in sponsored search ads . Our model is based on the assumption that users will visually scan the list of ads from the top to the bottom. After each ad, they make independent random decisions with ad-specific probabilities on whether to continue scanning. We then generalize the model in two ways: allowing for multiple separate blocks of ads, and allowing click probabilities to explicitly depend on ad positions as well. For the most basic model, we present a polynomial-time incentive-compatible auction mechanism for allocating and pricing ad slots. For the generalizations, we give approximation algorithms for the allocation of ads.