An experimental comparison of click position-bias models
WSDM '08 Proceedings of the 2008 International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining
Externalities in online advertising
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
A Cascade Model for Externalities in Sponsored Search
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Sponsored Search Auctions with Markovian Users
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
On the Equilibria and Efficiency of the GSP Mechanism in Keyword Auctions with Externalities
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Bidding on Configurations in Internet Ad Auctions
COCOON '09 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics
Externalities in Keyword Auctions: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Expressive auctions for externalities in online advertising
Proceedings of the 19th international conference on World wide web
Northern exposure: a field experiment measuring externalities between search advertisements
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
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We show that existence of negative externalities among market participants competing for a scarce resource, a setting typical for electronic commerce and internet advertising, allows for emergence of the no-allocation equilibrium with positive revenues for the seller. A monopolist selling K indivisible items to a large number of unit-demand buyers who face negative externalities whenever their rivals get the items, can exploit these negative externalities. If the number of buyers is large enough, the no-allocation equilibrium emerges: no items get allocated, yet buyers still pay the seller to avoid a potential exposure to negative externalities. We provide conditions on the magnitude of externalities and on the level of buyer competition that yield optimality of the no-allocation equilibrium. In the context of internet advertising, the no-allocation equilibrium allows the monopolist seller of a limited number of ad slots to simultaneously (1) optimize revenues by collecting a small payment from each of the potential advertisers who are concerned with negative externality effects, and (2) ensure ad-free experience to its users. Therefore, our results describe settings in which ad-free user experience can be supported not just by charging users, but could be subsidized by potential advertisers whose ads will not be shown.