On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Externalities in online advertising
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
Understanding and capturing people's privacy policies in a mobile social networking application
Personal and Ubiquitous Computing
A theory of expressiveness in mechanisms
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Externalities in Keyword Auctions: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
A New Ranking Scheme of the GSP Mechanism with Markovian Users
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Cost of conciseness in sponsored search auctions
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Bidding to the top: VCG and equilibria of position-based auctions
WAOA'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Approximation and Online Algorithms
Mathematical modeling of competition in sponsored search market
Proceedings of the 2010 Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation
An expressive mechanism for auctions on the web
Proceedings of the 20th international conference on World wide web
Multi-keyword sponsored search
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Money for nothing: exploiting negative externalities
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Sponsored search auctions with conflict constraints
Proceedings of the fifth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining
Relational click prediction for sponsored search
Proceedings of the fifth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining
Sponsored search auctions: an overview of research with emphasis on game theoretic aspects
Electronic Commerce Research
Budget optimization for online campaigns with positive carryover effects
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Ad allocation for browse sessions
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
New online algorithms for story scheduling in web advertising
ICALP'13 Proceedings of the 40th international conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Competitive auctions for markets with positive externalities
ICALP'13 Proceedings of the 40th international conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
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When online ads are shown together, they compete for user attention and conversions, imposing negative externalities on each other. While the competition for user attention in sponsored search can be captured via models of clickthrough rates, the post-click competition for conversions cannot: since the value-per-click of an advertiser is proportional to the conversion probability conditional on a click, which depends on the other ads displayed, the private value of an advertiser is no longer one-dimensional, and the GSP mechanism is not adequately expressive. We study the design of expressive GSP-like mechanisms for the simplest form that an advertiser's private value can have in the presence of such externalities- an advertiser's value depends on exclusivity, i.e., whether her ad is shown exclusively, or along with other ads. Our auctions take as input two-dimensional (per-click) bids for exclusive and nonexclusive display, and have two types of outcomes: either a single ad is displayed exclusively, or multiple ads are simultaneously shown. We design two expressive auctions that are both extensions of GSP- the first auction, GSP2D, is designed with the property that the allocation and pricing are identical to GSP when multiple ads are shown; the second auction, NP2D, is designed to be a next price auction. We show that both auctions have high efficiency and revenue in all reasonable equilibria; further, the NP2D auction is guaranteed to always have an equilibrium with revenue at least as much as the current GSP mechanism. However, we find that unlike with one-dimensional valuations, the GSP-like auctions for these richer valuations do not always preserve efficiency and revenue with respect to the VCG mechanism.