Privacy protection and advertising in a networked world
Privacy protection and advertising in a networked world
Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Budget optimization in search-based advertising auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
ACM SIGACT News
General auction mechanism for search advertising
Proceedings of the 18th international conference on World wide web
Bidding on Configurations in Internet Ad Auctions
COCOON '09 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics
Adaptive weighing designs for keyword value computation
Proceedings of the third ACM international conference on Web search and data mining
Expressive auctions for externalities in online advertising
Proceedings of the 19th international conference on World wide web
Cost of conciseness in sponsored search auctions
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment
Online advertisement service pricing and an option contract
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Pricing and bidding strategy in adwords auction under heterogeneous products scenario
ICSI'10 Proceedings of the First international conference on Advances in Swarm Intelligence - Volume Part II
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Many popular search engines run an auction to determine the placement of advertisements next to search results. Current auctions at Google and Yahoo! let advertisers specify a single amount as their bid in the auction. This bid is interpreted as the maximum amount the advertiser is willing to pay per click on its ad. When search queries arrive, the bids are used to rank the ads linearly on the search result page. Advertisers seek to be high on the list, as this attracts more attention and more clicks. The advertisers pay for each user who clicks on their ad, and the amount charged depends on the bids of all the advertisers participating in the auction. We study the problem of ranking ads and associated pricing mechanisms when the advertisers not only specify a bid, but additionally express their preference for positions in the list of ads. In particular, we study prefix position auctions where advertiser i can specify that she is interested only in the top κi positions. We present a simple allocation and pricing mechanism that generalizes the desirable properties of current auctions that do not have position constraints. In addition, we show that our auction has an envy-free [1] or symmetric [2] Nash equilibrium with the same outcome in allocation and pricing as the well-known truthful Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction. Furthermore, we show that this equilibrium is the best such equilibrium for the advertisers in terms of the profit made by each advertiser. We also discuss other position-based auctions.