Bidding to the top: VCG and equilibria of position-based auctions
WAOA'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Approximation and Online Algorithms
A theory of expressiveness in mechanisms
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Expressive banner ad auctions and model-based online optimization for clearing
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Methodology for designing reasonably expressive mechanisms with application to ad auctions
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Expressive auctions for externalities in online advertising
Proceedings of the 19th international conference on World wide web
Mathematical modeling of competition in sponsored search market
Proceedings of the 2010 Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation
Multi-keyword sponsored search
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Simplicity-expressiveness tradeoffs in mechanism design
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Composable and efficient mechanisms
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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The generalized second price auction used in sponsored search has been analyzed for models where bidders value clicks on ads. However, advertisers do not derive value only from clicks, nor do they value clicks in all slots equally. There is a need to understand sponsored search auctions in a setting with more general bidder valuations, in order to encompass realistic advertising objectives such as branding and conversions. We investigate the practical scenario where bidders have a full spectrum of values for slots, which are not necessarily proportional to the expected number of clicks received, and report a single scalar bid to the generalized second price auction. We show that there always exists an equilibrium corresponding to the VCG outcome using these full vector values, under monotonicity conditions on the valuations of bidders and clickthrough rates. Further, we discuss the problem of bidding strategies leading to such efficient equilibria: contrary to the case when bidders have one-dimensional types, bidding strategies with reasonable restrictions on bid values do not exist.