A further note on the stable matching problem
Discrete Applied Mathematics
Privacy protection and advertising in a networked world
Privacy protection and advertising in a networked world
Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mathematics of Operations Research
Algorithmic Game Theory
Bidding to the top: VCG and equilibria of position-based auctions
WAOA'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Approximation and Online Algorithms
Envy-Free Allocations for Budgeted Bidders
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Bidder Optimal Assignments for General Utilities
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
A novel click model and its applications to online advertising
Proceedings of the third ACM international conference on Web search and data mining
An expressive mechanism for auctions on the web
Proceedings of the 20th international conference on World wide web
Competitive equilibria in matching markets with budgets
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Multi-keyword sponsored search
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Single valued combinatorial auctions with budgets
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computation and incentives of competitive equilibria in a matching market
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Sponsored search auctions with conflict constraints
Proceedings of the fifth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining
Mechanisms for the marriage and the assignment game
CIAC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Algorithms and Complexity
Polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Co-evolution-based mechanism design for sponsored search advertising
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Sponsored search, market equilibria, and the Hungarian Method
Information Processing Letters
Proceedings of the sixth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining
Bidder optimal assignments for general utilities
Theoretical Computer Science
No More Damaging Ads on Your Own Webpage -- Strategy Proof Mechanisms for Ad Placement
WI-IAT '12 Proceedings of the The 2012 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
Optimal provision-after-wait in healthcare
Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science
Hi-index | 0.00 |
In sponsored search, a number of advertising slots is available on a search results page, and have to be allocated among a set of advertisers competing to display an ad on the page. This gives rise to a bipartite matching market that is typically cleared by the way of an automated auction. Several auction mechanisms have been proposed, with variants of the Generalized Second Price (GSP) being widely used in practice. There is a rich body of work on bipartite matching markets that builds upon the stable marriage model of Gale and Shapley and the assignment model of Shapley and Shubik. This line of research offers deep insights into the structure of stable outcomes in such markets and their incentive properties. In this paper, we model advertising auctions in terms of an assignment model with linear utilities, extended with bidder and item specific maximum and minimum prices. Auction mechanisms like the commonly used GSP or the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) can be interpreted as simply computing a bidder-optimal stable matching in this model, for a suitably defined set of bidder preferences, but our model includes much richer bidders and preferences. We prove that in our model the existence of a stable matching is guaranteed, and under a non-degeneracy assumption a bidder-optimal stable matching exists as well. We give an algorithm to find such matching in polynomial time, and use it to design truthful mechanism that generalizes GSP, is truthful for profit-maximizing bidders, correctly implements features like bidder-specific minimum prices and position-specific bids, and works for rich mixtures of bidders and preferences. Our main technical contributions are the existence of bidder-optimal matchings and strategyproofness of the resulting mechanism, and are proved by induction on the progress of the matching algorithm.