Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
M-Convex Function on Generalized Polymatroid
Mathematics of Operations Research
Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models
Discrete Mathematics
Relationship of M-/L-convex functions with discrete convex functions by Miller and Favati-Tardella
Discrete Applied Mathematics - Special issue on selected papers from First Japanese-Hungarian Symposium for Discrete Mathematics and its Applications
A fixed-point approach to stable matchings and some applications
Mathematics of Operations Research
Discrete Convex Analysis: Monographs on Discrete Mathematics and Applications 10
Discrete Convex Analysis: Monographs on Discrete Mathematics and Applications 10
Gross substitution, discrete convexity, and submodularity
Discrete Applied Mathematics - Submodularity
Discrete Applied Mathematics - Submodularity
Discrete Applied Mathematics
A Note on Kelso and Crawford's Gross Substitutes Condition
Mathematics of Operations Research
Coordinatewise domain scaling algorithm for M-convex function minimization
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
A capacity scaling algorithm for M-convex submodular flow
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions
Discrete Applied Mathematics
Two algorithms for the Student-Project Allocation problem
Journal of Discrete Algorithms
General auction mechanism for search advertising
Proceedings of the 18th international conference on World wide web
On multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
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The marriage model due to Gale and Shapley [Gale, D., L. S. Shapley. 1962. College admissions and the stability of marriage. Amer. Math. Monthly69 9--15] and the assignment model due to Shapley and Shubik [Shapley, L. S., M. Shubik. 1972. The assignment game I: The core. Internat. J. Game Theory1 111--130] are standard in the theory of two-sided matching markets. We give a common generalization of these models by utilizing discrete-concave functions and considering possibly bounded side payments. We show the existence of a pairwise stable outcome in our model. Our present model is a further natural extension of the model examined in our previous paper [Fujishige, S., A. Tamura. A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions. Discrete Appl. Math.154 950--970], and the proof of the existence of a pairwise stable outcome is even simpler than the previous one.