The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
Lower bounds for the stable marriage problem and its variants
SIAM Journal on Computing
Fundamentals of algorithmics
Hard variants of stable marriage
Theoretical Computer Science
Strong Stability in the Hospitals/Residents Problem
STACS '03 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
A fixed-point approach to stable matchings and some applications
Mathematics of Operations Research
IEEE Transactions on Education
Student project allocation using integer programming
IEEE Transactions on Education
Mathematics of Operations Research
Student-Project Allocation with preferences over Projects
Journal of Discrete Algorithms
Size Versus Stability in the Marriage Problem
Approximation and Online Algorithms
Size versus stability in the marriage problem
Theoretical Computer Science
The College Admissions problem with lower and common quotas
Theoretical Computer Science
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
TAMC'11 Proceedings of the 8th annual conference on Theory and applications of models of computation
The hospitals/residents problem with quota lower bounds
ESA'11 Proceedings of the 19th European conference on Algorithms
Journal of Discrete Algorithms
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We study the Student-Project Allocation problem (SPA), a generalisation of the classical Hospitals/Residents problem (HR). An instance of SPA involves a set of students, projects and lecturers. Each project is offered by a unique lecturer, and both projects and lecturers have capacity constraints. Students have preferences over projects, whilst lecturers have preferences over students. We present two optimal linear-time algorithms for allocating students to projects, subject to the preference and capacity constraints. In particular, each algorithm finds a stable matching of students to projects. Here, the concept of stability generalises the stability definition in the HR context. The stable matching produced by the first algorithm is simultaneously best-possible for all students, whilst the one produced by the second algorithm is simultaneously best-possible for all lecturers. We also prove some structural results concerning the set of stable matchings in a given instance of SPA. The SPA problem model that we consider is very general and has applications to a range of different contexts besides student-project allocation.