Forward looking Nash equilibrium for keyword auction
Information Processing Letters
Arbitrage opportunities across sponsored search markets
Theoretical Computer Science
General auction mechanism for search advertising
Proceedings of the 18th international conference on World wide web
Pure and Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy for Generalized Second Price Auction
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Competitive equilibria in matching markets with budgets
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
How profitable are strategic behaviors in a market?
ESA'11 Proceedings of the 19th European conference on Algorithms
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Matching market and its many variants have been an intensively studied problem in Economics and Computer Science. In many applications centralized prices are used to determine allocations of indivisible items under the principles of individual optimization and market clearance, based on public knowledge of individual preferences. Alternatively, auction mechanisms have been used with a different set of principles for the determination of prices, based on individuals' incentives to report their preferences. This talk considers matching markets run by a single seller with an objective of maximizing revenue of the seller, who employs a market equilibrium pricing for allocation. We will give a polynomial time algorithm to compute such an equilibrium given budget constraints, and show that the maximum revenue market equilibrium mechanism converges, under an optimal dynamic re-bidding sequence of the buyers, to a solution equivalent to the minimum revenue equilibrium under the true preferences of buyers, which in turn is revenue equivalent to a VCG solution. We will also discuss other related issues as well as open problems.