Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
General auction mechanism for search advertising
Proceedings of the 18th international conference on World wide web
ICALP '09 Proceedings of the 36th Internatilonal Collogquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part II
Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Repeated budgeted second price ad auction
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Revenue maximizing envy-free multi-unit auctions with budgets
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
On multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Proceedings of the sixth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining
Auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Composable and efficient mechanisms
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Repeated Budgeted Second Price Ad Auction
Theory of Computing Systems
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We consider budget constrained combinatorial auctions where each bidder has a private value for each of the items in some subset of the items and an overall budget constraint. Such auctions capture adword auctions, where advertisers offer a bid for those adwords that (hopefully) target their intended audience, and advertisers also have budgets. It is known that even if all items are identical and all budgets are public it is not possible to be truthful and efficient. Our main result is a novel auction that runs in polynomial time, is incentive compatible, and ensures Pareto-optimality. The auction is incentive compatible with respect to the private valuations whereas the budgets and the sets of interest are assumed to be public knowledge. This extends the result of Dobzinski, Lavi and Nisan (FOCS 2008) for auctions of multiple identical items with bugets to single-valued combinatorial auctions and address one of the basic challenges on auctioning web ads (see Nisan et al, 2009, Google auctions for tv ads).