Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Dynamics of bid optimization in online advertisement auctions
Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web
Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
AdWords and generalized online matching
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Algorithmic Game Theory
Improved Approximation Algorithms for Budgeted Allocations
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part I
Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Characterizing truthful multi-armed bandit mechanisms: extended abstract
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Pure and Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy for Generalized Second Price Auction
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Single valued combinatorial auctions with budgets
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
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Our main goal is to abstract existing repeated sponsored search ad auction mechanisms which incorporate budgets, and study their equilibrium and dynamics. Our abstraction has multiple agents bidding repeatedly for multiple identical items (such as impressions in an ad auction). The agents are budget limited and have a value per item. We abstract this repeated interaction as a one-shot game, which we call budget auction, where agents submit a bid and a budget, and then items are sold by a sequential second price auction. Once an agent exhausts its budget it does not participate in the proceeding auctions.Our main result shows that if agents bid conservatively (never bid above their value) then there always exists a pure Nash equilibrium. We also study simple dynamics of repeated budget auctions, showing their convergence to a Nash equilibrium for two agents and for multiple agents with identical budgets.