Sponsored search auctions

Authors:
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi
Affiliations:
Sapienza, University of Rome, Rome, Italy
Venue:
Proceedings of the sixth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining
Year:
2013

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Abstract

Sponsored search auctions are used to allocate ad slots to advertisers. The standard mechanism for sponsored search auctions is the Generalized-Second-Price (GSP) auction. Even if GSP seems to be established, a lot of open problems remain in the area and many significant researches have been done in the recent years. My research proposal is focusing in some specific aspects of the sponsored search auctions like revenue maximization and the design of mechanisms that obtain some form of social efficiency. In this paper we start from a brief history of the sponsored search auctions and then we present the formal model. In the last two sections I will introduce the obtained results and some open problems.