On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing
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ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
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Journal of Global Optimization
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We study the envy free pricing problem faced by a seller who wishes to maximize revenue by setting prices for bundles of items. If there is an unlimited supply of items and agents are single minded then we show that finding the revenue maximizing envy free allocation/pricing can be solved in polynomial time by reducing it to an instance of weighted independent set on a perfect graph.We define an allocation/pricing as multi envy free if no agent wishes to replace her allocation with the union of the allocations of some set of other agents and her price with the sum of their prices. We show that it is coNP-hard to decide if a given allocation/pricing is multi envy free. We also show that revenue maximization multi envy free allocation/pricing is APX hard.Furthermore, we give efficient algorithms and hardness results for various variants of the highway problem.