Polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Proceedings of the sixth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining
Auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We study the problem of allocating multiple identical items that may be complements to budget-constrained bidders with private values. We show that there does not exist a deterministic mechanism that is individually rational, strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient, and that does not make positive transfers. This is true even if there are only two players, two items, and the budgets are common knowledge. The same impossibility naturally extends to more abstract social choice settings with an arbitrary outcome set, assuming players with quasi-linear utilities and public budget limits. Thus, the case of infinite budgets (in which the VCG mechanism satisfies all these properties) is really the exception.