Bidder Optimal Assignments for General Utilities

Authors:
Paul Dütting;Monika Henzinger;Ingmar Weber
Affiliations:
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland;Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland;Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
Venue:
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Year:
2009

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Bidder optimal assignments for general utilities

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Abstract

We study the problem of matching bidders to items where each bidder i has general, strictly monotonic utility functions u i,j (p j ) expressing her utility of being matched to item j at price p j . For this setting we prove that a bidder optimal outcome always exists, even when the utility functions are non-linear and non-continuous. Furthermore, we give an algorithm to find such a solution. Although the running time of this algorithm is exponential in the number of items, it is polynomial in the number of bidders.