Mechanisms for the marriage and the assignment game

Authors:
Paul Dütting;Monika Henzinger
Affiliations:
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Station 14, Lausanne;Fakultät für Informatik, Universität Wien, Wien
Venue:
CIAC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Algorithms and Complexity
Year:
2010

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Abstract

Starting with two models fifty years ago, the discrete marriage game [1] and the continuous assignment game [2], the study of stable matchings has evolved into a rich theory with applications in many areas. Most notably, it has lead to a number of truthful mechanisms that have seen a recent rejuvenation in the context of sponsored search. In this paper we survey the history of these problems and provide several links to ongoing research in the field.