Combinatorial Auctions
Algorithmic Game Theory
A Cascade Model for Externalities in Sponsored Search
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Sponsored Search Auctions with Markovian Users
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
General auction mechanism for search advertising
Proceedings of the 18th international conference on World wide web
Toward Expressive and Scalable Sponsored Search Auctions
ICDE '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE 24th International Conference on Data Engineering
Bidding on Configurations in Internet Ad Auctions
COCOON '09 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics
CABOB: a fast optimal algorithm for combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Expressive auctions for externalities in online advertising
Proceedings of the 19th international conference on World wide web
Northern exposure: a field experiment measuring externalities between search advertisements
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An expressive mechanism for auctions on the web
Proceedings of the 20th international conference on World wide web
Predictive model performance: offline and online evaluations
Proceedings of the 19th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
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In sponsored search auctions advertisers compete for ad slots in the search engine results page, by bidding on keywords of interest. To improve advertiser expressiveness, we augment the bidding process with conflict constraints. With such constraints, advertisers can condition their bids on the non-appearance of certain undesired ads on the results page. We study the complexity of the allocation problem in these augmented SSA and we introduce an algorithm that can efficiently allocate the ad slots to advertisers. We evaluate the algorithm run time in simulated conflict scenarios and we study the implications of the conflict constraints on search engine revenue. Our results show that the allocation problem can be solved within few tens of milliseconds and that the adoption of conflict constraints can potentially increase search engine revenue.