Bidding on Configurations in Internet Ad Auctions

Authors:
S. Muthukrishnan
Affiliations:
Google Inc., New York, 10011
Venue:
COCOON '09 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics
Year:
2009

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Abstract

In Internet advertising, a configuration of ads is determined by the seller, and advertisers buy spaces in the configuration. In this paper, motivated by sponsored search ads, we propose an auction where advertisers directly bid and determine the eventual configuration.