An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Evaluating the accuracy of implicit feedback from clicks and query reformulations in Web search
ACM Transactions on Information Systems (TOIS)
An experimental comparison of click position-bias models
WSDM '08 Proceedings of the 2008 International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining
Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions
Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions
A Cascade Model for Externalities in Sponsored Search
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Sponsored Search Auctions with Markovian Users
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Pure and Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy for Generalized Second Price Auction
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Externalities among advertisers in sponsored search
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
A truthful learning mechanism for contextual multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalities
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Computationally efficient techniques for economic mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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Sponsored search is one of the most successful applications of economic mechanisms in real life. A crucial issue is the modeling of the user behavior to provide the best targeting of ads to each user. Experimental studies show that the click through rate of an ad is dramatically affected by both its position and the other displayed ads. However, these externalities rise severe currently open computational issues in the determination of the best allocation and of the payments, preventing their adoption in practice so far. In the present paper, we provide a number of results when the most famous externality model, the cascade model, is adopted: we design the first exact algorithm for computing the efficient allocation, we show that the previously presented constant--approximation algorithm does not lead to any incentive compatible mechanism, we design a monotonic constant--approximation algorithm for finding the allocation and two different polynomial--time algorithms for the payments, each with different properties, leading to incentive compatible mechanisms. Finally, we provide a thorough experimental evaluation of the presented algorithms with Yahoo! Webscope A3 dataset to identify which mechanism should be adopted in concrete applications.