An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions
Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions
A Cascade Model for Externalities in Sponsored Search
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A truthful learning mechanism for contextual multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalities
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Breaking for commercials: characterizing mobile advertising
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Internet measurement conference
Which mechanism for sponsored search auctions with externalities?
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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My Ph.D. thesis is focused on the field of mechanism design, a branch of game theory that aims to study interaction mechanisms for rational agents. The basic goal is the design of direct--revelation mechanisms that are stable. Given the valuations reported by the agents, a mechanism determines the outcome of the interaction by means of an objective function. In some contexts, such objective function cannot lead to a stable mechanism or finding an optimal solution is NP-hard. The goal of my studies is the development of techniques to deal with these situations. The basic idea is to design a new objective function that approximates at best the original one, but, at the same time can be used to build a stable mechanism computable in polynomial time. During my Ph.D., I will extend the techniques currently available in the state of the art to more general situations and I will apply such techniques to the important field of ad auctions.