AdWords and Generalized On-line Matching
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Efficient algorithms for online decision problems
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue: Learning theory 2003
An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Playing games with approximation algorithms
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
AdWords and generalized online matching
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Regret minimization and the price of total anarchy
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part I
Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Bayes-nash equilibria of the generalized second price auction
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Price of anarchy for greedy auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Pure and Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy for Generalized Second Price Auction
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On optimal single-item auctions
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On revenue in the generalized second price auction
Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web
Polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy in games of incomplete information
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Sponsored search auctions: an overview of research with emphasis on game theoretic aspects
Electronic Commerce Research
Revenue guarantees in sponsored search auctions
ESA'12 Proceedings of the 20th Annual European conference on Algorithms
Risk sensitivity of price of anarchy under uncertainty
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Auctions with unique equilibria
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Composable and efficient mechanisms
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Hi-index | 0.00 |
The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction is the primary method by which sponsered search advertisements are sold. We study the performance of this auction in the Bayesian setting for players with correlated types. Correlation arises very naturally in the context of sponsored search auctions, especially as a result of uncertainty inherent in the behaviour of the underlying ad allocation algorithm. We demonstrate that the Bayesian Price of Anarchy of the GSP auction is bounded by $4$, even when agents have arbitrarily correlated types. Our proof highlights a connection between the GSP mechanism and the concept of smoothness in games, which may be of independent interest. For the special case of uncorrelated (i.e. independent) agent types, we improve our bound to 2(1-1/e)-1 ≅ 3.16, significantly improving upon previously known bounds. Using our techniques, we obtain the same bound on the performance of GSP at coarse correlated equilibria, which captures (for example) a repeated-auction setting in which agents apply regret-minimizing bidding strategies. Moreoever, our analysis is robust against the presence of irrational bidders and settings of asymmetric information, and our bounds degrade gracefully when agents apply strategies that form only an approximate equilibrium.