Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mathematics of Operations Research
Stochastic variability in sponsored search auctions: observations and models
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
GSP auctions with correlated types
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Simplicity-expressiveness tradeoffs in mechanism design
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On revenue in the generalized second price auction
Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web
Revenue guarantees in sponsored search auctions
ESA'12 Proceedings of the 20th Annual European conference on Algorithms
Ranking and tradeoffs in sponsored search auctions
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Auctions with unique equilibria
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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We develop a Bayes-Nash analysis of the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction. First, we characterize the efficient Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the GSP when such an equilibrium exists. We obtain sufficient conditions on click-through rates that guarantee existence and show that an efficient equilibrium may fail to exist if click-through rates across slots are sufficiently close. Next, we derive the counter-intuitive result that the seller's revenue may decrease as click-through rates increase. Fortunately, we show that setting optimal reserve prices reverses this result. Further, we prove that the GSP possesses no mixed strategy equilibrium and that no inefficient equilibrium can be symmetric.