Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Dynamics of bid optimization in online advertisement auctions
Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web
Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Bayes-nash equilibria of the generalized second price auction
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Auctions with revenue guarantees for sponsored search
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Equilibrium analysis of dynamic bidding in sponsored search auctions
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
On revenue in the generalized second price auction
Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web
Discrete choice models of bidder behavior in sponsored search
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Position-normalized click prediction in search advertising
Proceedings of the 18th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Ranking and tradeoffs in sponsored search auctions
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Query clustering based on bid landscape for sponsored search auction optimization
Proceedings of the 19th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Ad impression forecasting for sponsored search
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
A predictive model for advertiser value-per-click in sponsored search
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
Predicting advertiser bidding behaviors in sponsored search by rationality modeling
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
A game- heoretic machine learning approach for revenue maximization in sponsored search
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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Sponsored search advertisement slots are currently sold via Generalized Second Price (GSP) auctions. Despite the simplicity of their rules, these auctions are far from being fully understood. Our observations on real ad-auction data show that advertisers usually enter many distinct auctions with different opponents and with varying parameters. We describe some of our findings from these observations and propose a simple probabilistic model taking them into account. This model can be used to predict the number of clicks received by the advertisers and the total price they can expect to pay depending on their bid, or even to estimate the players valuations, all at a very low computational cost.