An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Dynamics of bid optimization in online advertisement auctions
Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web
AdWords and generalized online matching
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Bayes-nash equilibria of the generalized second price auction
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Menu pricing competition and a common agency with informed principals
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Sponsored search auctions: an overview of research with emphasis on game theoretic aspects
Electronic Commerce Research
Competing intermediary auctions
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Signaling Competition and Social Welfare
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
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We consider a model with two simultaneous VCG ad auctions A and B where each advertiser chooses to participate in a single ad auction. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium in that model. Moreover, when the click rates in A are pointwise higher than those in B, we prove that the expected revenue in A is greater than the expected revenue in B in this equilibrium. In contrast, we show that this revenue ranking does not hold when advertisers can participate in both auctions.