On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part I
Non-price equilibria in markets of discrete goods
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Sequential auctions and externalities
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Price competition in online combinatorial markets
Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on World wide web
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Item bidding auctions are a line of research which provides a simple and often efficient alternative to traditional combinatorial auction design - in particular, they were inspired by real world auction houses, like eBay and Sotheby's. We survey the literature from a culinary perspective, offering an intuitive illustration of the welfare in simultaneous and sequential auctions. Welfare in simultaneous first and second price auctions is high when bidders have complement-free valuations. In contrast, sequential second price auctions can lead to bad outcomes due to signaling problems and even in the case of first price, a good outcome is only guaranteed for unit demand bidders. We give an intuitive interpretation of an example with bad welfare in sequential first price auctions with submodular bidders from Paes Leme, Syrgkanis and Tardos (SODA'12).