Setting equilibrium prices, approximately

Authors:
Brendan Lucier
Affiliations:
Microsoft Research New England
Venue:
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Year:
2013

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Abstract

We outline recent results, positive and negative, on pricing indivisible goods to approximately maximize social welfare. We describe a relaxation of standard pricing problems in which a seller can bundle goods together prior to sale.