Bid determination in simultaneous actions an agent architecture
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Combinatorial Auctions
Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part I
Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Price of anarchy for greedy auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Pure and Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy for Generalized Second Price Auction
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Non-price equilibria in markets of discrete goods
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms: toward optimal combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Limitations of Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Sequential auctions and externalities
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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In a combinatorial auction (CA) with item bidding, several goods are sold simultaneously via single-item auctions. We study how the equilibrium performance of such an auction depends on the choice of the underlying single-item auction. We provide a thorough understanding of the price of anarchy, as a function of the single-item auction payment rule. When the payment rule depends on the winner's bid, as in a first-price auction, we characterize the worst-case price of anarchy in the corresponding CAs with item bidding in terms of a sensitivity measure of the payment rule. As a corollary, we show that equilibrium existence guarantees broader than that of the first-price rule can only be achieved by sacrificing its property of having only fully efficient (pure) Nash equilibria. For payment rules that are independent of the winner's bid, we prove a strong optimality result for the canonical second-price auction. First, its set of pure Nash equilibria is always a superset of that of every other payment rule. Despite this, its worst-case POA is no worse than that of any other payment rule that is independent of the winner's bid.