Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auctions: branch and bound heuristics
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
A unified approach to approximating resource allocation and scheduling
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
(Incremental) priority algorithms
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Clique is hard to approximate within n1-
FOCS '96 Proceedings of the 37th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Linear degree extractors and the inapproximability of max clique and chromatic number
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multi-unit auctions with unknown supply
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful unsplittable flow for large capacity networks
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallel algorithms and architectures
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part I
On the Hardness of Being Truthful
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Truthful Mechanisms via Greedy Iterative Packing
APPROX '09 / RANDOM '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Workshop and 13th International Workshop on Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Price of anarchy for greedy auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
How well can primal-dual and local-ratio algorithms perform?
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Greedy approximation via duality for packing, combinatorial auctions and routing
MFCS'05 Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
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We study the combinatorial auction (CA) problem, in which m objects are sold to rational agents and the goal is to maximize social welfare. Of particular interest is the special case in which agents are interested in sets of size at most s (s-CAs), where a simple greedy algorithm obtains an s+1 approximation but no truthful algorithm is known to perform better than O(m/√logm). As partial work towards resolving this gap, we ask: what is the power of truthful greedy algorithms for CA problems? The notion of greediness is associated with a broad class of algorithms, known as priority algorithms, which encapsulates many natural auction methods. We show that no truthful greedy priority algorithm can obtain an approximation to the CA problem that is sublinear in m, even for s-CAs with s ≥ 2.