Inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions

Authors:
Subhash Khot;Richard J. Lipton;Evangelos Markakis;Aranyak Mehta
Affiliations:
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA;Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA;Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA;Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA
Venue:
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Year:
2005

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Abstract

We consider the following allocation problem arising in the setting of combinatorial auctions: a set of goods is to be allocated to a set of players so as to maximize the sum of the utilities of the players (i.e., the social welfare). In the case when the utility of each player is a monotone submodular function, we prove that there is no polynomial time approximation algorithm which approximates the maximum social welfare by a factor better than 1–1/e ≃ 0.632, unless P = NP. Our result is based on a reduction from a multi-prover proof system for MAX-3-COLORING.