Data structures and network algorithms
Data structures and network algorithms
STOC '92 Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Some optimal inapproximability results
STOC '97 Proceedings of the twenty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The budgeted maximum coverage problem
Information Processing Letters
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A combinatorial algorithm minimizing submodular functions in strongly polynomial time
Journal of Combinatorial Theory Series B
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Algorithmic derandomization via complexity theory
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The Communication Complexity of Approximate Set Packing and Covering
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Combinatorial Auctions
Exponential communication inefficiency of demand queries
TARK '05 Proceedings of the 10th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Welfare maximization in congestion games
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Implementing the maximum of monotone algorithms
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Better mechanisms for combinatorial auctions via maximal-in-range algorithms?
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Tight information-theoretic lower bounds for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
APPROX '07/RANDOM '07 Proceedings of the 10th International Workshop on Approximation and the 11th International Workshop on Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Inapproximability of Combinatorial Public Projects
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling
Theoretical Computer Science
Implementing the maximum of monotone algorithms
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Approximation algorithms for k-duplicates combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders
COCOA'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Combinatorial optimization and applications
Computation and incentives in combinatorial public projects
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithms for Recognizing Economic Properties in Matrix Bid Combinatorial Auctions
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A game-theoretic method of fair resource allocation for cloud computing services
The Journal of Supercomputing
Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
On the limitations of Greedy mechanism design for truthful combinatorial auctions
ICALP'10 Proceedings of the 37th international colloquium conference on Automata, languages and programming
Single-parameter combinatorial auctions with partially public valuations
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On the Computational Power of Demand Queries
SIAM Journal on Computing
Multi-unit auctions: beyond roberts
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A truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Geometric rounding: a dependent randomized rounding scheme
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Mechanisms with verification for any finite domain
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Bayesian incentive compatibility via fractional assignments
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Extending characterizations of truthful mechanisms from subdomains to domains
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Optimization with demand oracles
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The computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
A lower bound of 1 + ϕ for truthful scheduling mechanisms
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
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We exhibit three approximation algorithms for the allocation problem in combinatorial auctions with complement free bidders. The running time of these algorithms is polynomial in the number of items $m$ and in the number of bidders n, even though the "input size" is exponential in m. The first algorithm provides an O(log m) approximation. The second algorithm provides an O(√ m) approximation in the weaker model of value oracles. This algorithm is also incentive compatible. The third algorithm provides an improved 2-approximation for the more restricted case of "XOS bidders", a class which strictly contains submodular bidders. We also prove lower bounds on the possible approximations achievable for these classes of bidders. These bounds are not tight and we leave the gaps as open problems.