Approximation algorithms for k-duplicates combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders

Authors:
Wenbin Chen;Jiangtao Meng
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, P.R. China;Department of Computer Science, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, P.R. China
Venue:
COCOA'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Combinatorial optimization and applications
Year:
2007

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Abstract

In this paper, we study the problem of maximizing welfare in combinatorial auctions with k duplicates of each item, where bidders are subadditive. We present two approximation algorithms for k-duplicates combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders. First, we give a factor-O (√m) approximation algorithm for k-duplicates combinatorial auctions with subadditive valuations using value queries. This algorithm is also incentive compatible. Secondly, we give a factor-O(log m) approximation algorithm for k-duplicates combinatorial auctions with subadditive valuations using demand queries.