A polynomial algorithm for b-matchings: an alternative approach
Information Processing Letters
Negotiation and cooperation in multi-agent environments
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Combinatorial optimization
Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Artificial Intelligence
Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Constrained multi-object auctions and b-matching
Information Processing Letters
Electronic Commerce: From Economic and Game-Theoretic Models to Working Protocols
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: Optimal and Approximate Approaches
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
A Classification Structure for Automated Negotiations
WI-IATW '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE/WIC/ACM international conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology
Exact algorithms for the matrix bid auction
Computers and Operations Research
Approximation algorithms for k-duplicates combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders
COCOA'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Combinatorial optimization and applications
Fractional matching via balls-and-bins
APPROX'06/RANDOM'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems, and 10th international conference on Randomization and Computation
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
Decomposing combinatorial auctions and set packing problems
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
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Auctions are the most widely used strategic game-theoretic mechanisms in the Internet. Auctions have been mostly studied from a game-theoretic and economic perspective, although recent work in AI and OR has been concerned with computational aspects of auctions as well. When faced from a computational perspective, combinatorial auctions are perhaps the most challenging type of auctions. Combinatorial auctions are auctions where agents may submit bids for bundles of goods. Given that finding an optimal allocation of the goods in a combinatorial auction is in general intractable, researchers have been concerned with exposing tractable instances of combinatorial auctions. In this work we expose the use of b-matching techniques in the context of combinatorial auctions, and apply them in a non-trivial manner in order to introduce polynomial solutions for a variety of combinatorial auctions.