Communication complexity
iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction
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AkBA: a progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
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Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Vote elicitation: complexity and strategy-proofness
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On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries
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Some complexity questions related to distributive computing(Preliminary Report)
STOC '79 Proceedings of the eleventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Preference Elicitation and Query Learning
The Journal of Machine Learning Research
Effectiveness of Query Types and Policies for Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Exponential communication inefficiency of demand queries
TARK '05 Proceedings of the 10th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Welfare maximization in congestion games
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Tight information-theoretic lower bounds for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Informational overhead of incentive compatibility
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A modular framework for iterative combinatorial auctions
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
ICALP '09 Proceedings of the 36th Internatilonal Collogquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part II
Valuation uncertainty and imperfect introspection in second-price auctions
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
On Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
Approximation algorithms for k-duplicates combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders
COCOA'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Combinatorial optimization and applications
Algorithms and theory of computation handbook
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Combinatorial auctions with restricted complements
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Learning on a budget: posted price mechanisms for online procurement
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
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We embark on a systematic analysis of the power and limitations of iterative combinatorial auctions. Most existing iterative combinatorial auctions are based on repeatedly suggesting prices for bundles of items, and querying the bidders for their "demand" under these prices. We prove a large number of results showing the boundaries of what can be achieved by auctions of this kind. We first focus on auctions that use a polynomial number of demand queries, and then we analyze the power of different kinds of ascending-price auctions.