Computation and incentives in combinatorial public projects

Authors:
Dave Buchfuhrer;Michael Schapira;Yaron Singer
Affiliations:
Caltech, Pasadena, CA, USA;Yale University, New Haven, CT, and University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA;University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
Venue:
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Year:
2010

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Abstract

The Combinatorial Public Projects Problem (CPPP) is an abstraction of resource allocation problems in which agents have preferences over alternatives, and an outcome that is to be collectively shared by the agents is chosen so as to maximize the social welfare. We explore CPPP from both computational perspective and a mechanism design perspective. We examine CPPP in the hierarchy of complement free (subadditive) valuation classes and present positive and negative results for both unrestricted and truthful algorithms.